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NOTES AND COMMENTS
END OF IDEOLOGY? A TREND ANALYSIS OF
COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTH IN TEN
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES
Michael F. O'Keefe
University ofKansas
During the early 1960s, a number of prominent political and
social theorists argued that one of the major results of the pheno-
menal economic growth of Western Europe after World War II
was the "deradicalization" of politics. Ideology would cease to
be a major' factor as the radical parties of the left and right
responded to a breakdown in traditional class cleavages to pursue
"pragmatic" programs of economic reforrn.! More recent studies
focusing on value changes (Inglehart, 1971) and capital-labor
confrontations (Hibbs, 1976) in these countries suggest, however,
that ideological politics has not disappeared. This paper examines
trends in strength of the communist parties in ten West European
nations to determine whether their hypothesized decline as a
result of economic development/ has occurred.
Communist parties were chosen for the analysis on the basis
of two of their characteristics: (1) as revolutionary social move-
ments they require a great deal of commitment from their
members (Kriegel, 1972) and are likely to be more susceptible
to membership decline if the "new Europe" theorists are correct,
and (2) they "remain important agencies for the mobilization of
latent discontent and the crystallization of labor-capital cleavages"
in advanced industrial societies (Hibbs, 1976:1058).
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNIST
PARTY STRENGTH
Lipset (1960) argued that sustained economic growth" and
the relative absence of economic crises combined with increased
levels of citizen education result in declines in economic insecur-
ity and high levels of citizen political sophistication. This cluster
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of factors associated with "economic development" contributes
to the decline of ideologically based politics and to lessened
strength for ideological parties:
The instability of the democratic process in general and the
strength of the Communists in particular ... are clearly related to
national levels of economic development including levels of
educational attainment. The Communists represent a mass
movement in the poorer countries of Europe and elsewhere, but
are weak where economic development and educational attain-
ment are high (Lipset, 1960:125).
The continued existence of communist parties in the advanced
developed societies is based mainly upon their appeal to the
lowest status groups (Lumpenproletariat) and isolated workers.
Noting that Lipset's findings were based upon a sample
heavily biased toward Western democracies, Marsh and Parish
(1965) challenged the cross-national validity of those findings.
Utilizing a large cross-national sample, they found that com-
munist party strength was positively related to economic de-
velopment at the lower levels of development. .At the higher
levels, however, Lipset's hypothesized inverse relationship was
supported by their data.
Seeking a comprehensive theoretical explanation for the
Marsh and Parish findings, Benjamin and Kautsky (1968) hy-
pothesized that while communist parties are modernizing move-
ments that aggregate dissatisfaction at all levels of economic
.development, the dissatisfied segments of society vary. In societies
where. modernization, has not begun, where there has been little
'impact of western industrialization, "there are no communist
parties. As modernization begins, intellectuals striving for greater
progress join the party. Given the numbers of intellectuals in
these societies, the parties are relatively small. With further de-
velopment, the parties begin to grow as they draw support from
more intellectuals, the urban middle strata, and the incipient
labor movement, peaking at the next level as they expand their
appeal to the workers in largely "antilabor" societies. For the
most developed nations, they argue:
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As economic development proceeds, however, these latter groups
(small peasants, middle strata of shopkeepers and artisans) are
absorbed by the advanced industrial economy, either to disappear
or to be converted into farmers or small businessmen, and
workers become integrated into the society and are no longer
alienated. With high economic development, then, Communist
party strength may be expected to be very low (Benjamin and
Kautsky, 1968:111, parentheses added).
Hibbs (1973) partially confirmed this hypothesis as part of
a massive investigation of political violence. He noted, however,
that social mobilization (Deutsch, 1961, 1966) significantly
increased the amount of explained variance in communist party
size. Although social mobilization has been traditionally linked
with economic development, it has been empirically demonstrated
to be a separate concept (Hibbs, 1973).3
All of the literature cited above, however, has been recently
challenged. Hibbs (1976) has demonstrated that strike activity in
advanced industrial societies has not declined with economic
development. More significantly, Inglehart (1971), seeking an
explanation for the radicalism of the late 1960s and early 1970s,
predicted that a significant value change is occurring in these
countries which is likely to produce further ideological conflict.
Using Maslow's need hierarchy for the theoretical base,
Inglehart argued that a postwar generation, socialized during a
period of economic abundance and accompanying bourgeois
values, has shifted its value priorities to Maslow's highest level.
Their accompanying political values are no-w in conflict with
the bourgeois value structure of advanced industrial society,
creating a new group to take the place of the traditional de-
politicized working class.
ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN COMMUNIST
PARTY STRENGTH
The selection of the sample of ten countries listed in Table 1
was based upon the following criteria: (1) use in other major
studies of communist party strength (Lipset, 1960; Benjamin
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** Benjamin and Kautsky (1968) classified societies into five types based upon their
level of economic development. Type V is the highest type.
* Lipset (1960:30,Fn7) classified democracies as stable or unstable based upon whether
or not any totalitarian movement received 20 percent of the vote since approximately
1935, and whether or not political democracy- continued uninterrupted since WWI.
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and Kautsky, 1968; Hibbs, 1973); (2) similarity of historical
development, economic structure, and culture relative to other
nations; (3) political cultures with a well-defined left tradition
and full legal status for the communist parties."
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This latter measure is based upon the assumption that political
systems contain segments of the population that are the revolu-
tionary forces (communist party members), segments against
them (those voting for other parties), and a neutral segment
(those not voting), and hence not included in the measure. This
latter part of the population is seen as potentially mobilized by
either side, creating a research question as to which side will be
able to mobilize them, and under what conditions. It is assumed,
moreover, that the parties are open, that is, that they place no
upper numerical limit on membership.
In order to determine trends in the two measures of party
strength, each was regressed against a third degree polynomial
term for time.? For each country, the first election during or
after 1944 was the initial time point (t=O), with time increased
by 1 (tl, t2 ... tn) for each subsequent election. Each term in
the polynomial then indicates a bend in the time line. A country
whose best fit trend is a postwar decline in party strength followed
by increases would be best described by a second degree poly-
nomial where the least squares estimator for time itself is negative
and the estimator for the squared value of time is positive. If
the R2 change due to the square value of time is not significant
at the .05 level, then the best fit line is that predicted by Lipset,
a declining communist party strength. The third degree value of
time (time cubed) will indicate whether any upward movement
in party strength is of but a temporary nature.
For each country, the sign of the regression coefficient
indicates the trend direction, its magnitude indicates the rate of
change, and the R2 in-dicates how" well the line/curve fits the
strength data. The magnitude of the squared term relative to
time itself will provide an indication of how early (in time) the
bend occurs in the time line. Similarly, the same comparison
should be made for the cubed value of time relative to the other
two values.f
Thus, if Lipset is correct that the strength of communist
parties declines in economically developed societies, the data
in Table 2 would show either: (1) a significant negative regression
coefficient for time, or (2) a large value for that coefficient
Estimated Membership of
Communist Party
Number of Votes Cast for Other
Parties in Last Election
Relative Party Size
TABLE 1
CO~PARISON OF SAMPLE WITH OTHER STUDIES CITED
Benjamin
Lipset* & Kautsky** Hibbs Inglehart Hibbs
SAMPLE (1960) (1968) (1973) (1971) (1976)
Austria Unstable V X
Belgium Stable V X X X
Denmark Stable V X
Finland Unstable N X
France Unstable IV X X X
Italy Unstable IV X X X
Netherlands Stable V X X X
Norway Stable V X X
Sweden Stable V X X
Switzerland Stable V X
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Two indicators of communist party strength are used in the
trend analysis. The first measure, the percent of votes received
by the communist parties, is relatively straightforward. It taps
the ability of the Western 'European Communist party to perform ~
one of its self-appointed tasks-legislative representation. ~
A second measure,6 capable of assessing the membership
strength of communist parties relative to other actors in the
system, is "relative party size." Unlike voting strength, which
includes voters who are not communists, this measure taps the
"more permanent" strength of the parties.
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CONCLUSIONS
The lack of consistent trends exhibited in the ten countries
makes it clear that more research is required before the "end of
ideology" - "decline of left extremism" thesis can be accepted.
While a certain amount of the disparity is due to country char-
acteristics, the high degree of homogeneity between these coun-
tries should have produced more conclusive results. One of the
difficulties for future researchers is the lack of theoretical
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relative to the regression coefficient for the squared value of time,
indicating a decline followed by a leveling off at a low level.
The Italian communist party experienced a decline in re-
lative strength since WW II, but little change in voting strength.
This is somewhat surprising since Italy was classified as both Type
IV and unstable (Table 1) and should experience a growing com-
munist party.
The parties in Finland, Switzerland, Denmark, and the
Netherlands fit Lipset's findings in varying degrees. In each coun-
try, the party shows an initial decline on both indicators of
strength (although the decline is relatively small for Finland as
demonstrated by the extremely small regression coefficient re-
lative to the constant). The data for Denmark and the Nether-
lands, however, show increases in both indicators following that
decline. The Norwegian party follows a similar pattern on the
Voting Percentage indicator, but not in Relative Strength.
The trends in strength for the remaining four countries
differ considerably. Belgium experienced an initial decline,
followed by growth, and decline again on all indicators of party
strength. The large values for R2 indicate that the third degree
polynomial fits quite well in this case. Austria, on the other
hand, presents a mixed case. While no significant trend is fit by
the polynomial for Vote Percentage, the Austrian communist
party shows an increasing trend in the Relative Size measure with
a large R2 indicating a close fit of the regression equation with
the data. Variations in the strength of the communist parties of
France and Sweden cannot be described by the polynomial
.regression as seen from the result of the F-test.·
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APPENDIX: DATA POINTS AND SOURCES (Concluded)
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development concerning the concept of economic development.
will further economic growth produce an end to radicalism? The
trends in certain countries seem to support Inglehart's hypo-
thesis that it will not-or will only so long as the value structure
supporting increased development carries significant weight.
If an economic development variable had been included in place
of time, perhaps an answer would be in sight. It is possible that
increased left radicalism accompanies economic stagnation in
advanced industrial societies. If Inglehart is correct that workers
possess bourgeois values, what would be -the significance for
radical parties of the left, right, or center? if the expectations
resulting from these values are unmet? By demonstrating that
no clear trend seems to exist in the countries examined, further
research concerning these questions seems warranted utilizing
data showing party choice by occupation and age cohort.
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APPENDIX: DATA POINTS AND SOURCES Total Sample by country and year.
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Data Sources:
Variable
Relative Party
Size
Percentage of vote
for communist party
Percentages of votes
by non-communist
left parties.
Measure
1. Party Size
2. Vote for Com-
munist Party
3. Total Vote
Source
Estimated membership from
World Strength .of Com-
munist Party Organization.
Missing data were estimated
using average changes.
World Strength... Missing
data filled in from Keesings
Contemporary Archives.
Computed from votes and
·percentages of votes for
communist party from
above sources.
World Strength ; missing
data from Keesings .
Same as above.
Taken directly from World
Strength . . . where available.
Missing data filled in from
Keesings ... using parties
characterized as "left" in
World Strength.
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NOTES
1. Hibbs (1973:22) summarized this thesis as follows:
End of Ideology?
5. A more direct measure, percent of seats won in the lower house, must
account for difference in electoral representation laws, some of which
were adopted specifically to hinder the opportunities of communist
parties. See Rae, 1971.
9. Lipset (1960) argues that fascism is extremism of the center.
7. The formula used to evaluate best fit trend lines (curve) is:
(R 2 with Kth order term) - (R 2 without Kt h order term)
8. The table below shows an imaginary example using a regression co-
efficient for time of 2.0 and three values for the regression coefficient
for the squared value of time-l.0, 0.5, 0.25. The values in column 1
are the time points. The values in columns 2, 3, and 4 represent the
predicted values of the dependent variable (using a constant = 0).
6. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of various mea-
sures of communist party strength, see Benjamin and Kautsky (1968)
and O'Keefe (1977 :27-32). The need for two measures arises from
Lipset's (1963) contention that membership in left parties would decline
in the. "new Europe" while voting strength would not. The stability of
voting strength is based on the argument that left party programs would
adjust (become pragmatic) in response to changing social cleavages.
. (1-R2 with Kth order term)/(N-K-l)
2 3 4
B time =-2.0 B time =-2.0 B time =-2.0
B time2 = 1.0 B time2 = 0.5 B time2 = 0.25
-1.00 -1.50 -1.75
0 -2.00 -3.00
3.00 -3.50 -3.75
8.00 0 -4.00
15.00 2.50 -3.75
26.00 6.00 -3.00
35.00 10.00 -1.75
48.00 16.00 0
63.00 22.50 2.25
80.00 30.00 5.00
F
tl
t2
t3
t4
tS
t6
t7
t8
t9
tl0
1
3. O'Keefe (1977) retested Hibbs's empirical model using two time
points. He found that while the social mobilization variable produced
consistent parameter estimates, the signs of the parameter estimate
for the economic development variable changed.
The "new Europe" is. where the growth of affluence is seen to
produce social systems in which class conflict is minimized as
all classes are integrated into society and polity. So large a
proportion of the population is now feeling the advantageous
effects of economic development that the age-old obsession
with the distribution of profits is weakened and the "modern"
concern with development is reinforced. The formerly alienated
working class, in the view of these theorists, is now at peace
with the industrial system, and idealogy has lost. its former
relevance as the absence of a suppressed class leaves little hope
for radicalism. Rational calculation has come to replace
ideology and dogma. . . .
For the complete arguments; see the essays by Lip set , Dahrendorf,
Aron, and Haas in Graubard (1963). For a somewhat different ex-
planation of ideological changes see Bell (1960).
2. In addition to the works cited in Note 1, there is a body of empirical
literature (Lipset, 1960; Marsh and Parish, 1965; Benjamin and Kautsky,
1968) that confirms the hypothesized inverse relationship between
economic development and communist party strength in the more
industrialized nations.
4. . The absence of a left tradition .and ..fell legal status would appear to
significantly affect communist party strength. In the United States,
forexarnple, joining the Communist Patty is not considered to be a
viable political activity. In fact, the socialization process teaches that
the Communist Party is an enemy of the democratic traditions in that
country. Even during the surge of radicalism in the 1960s, there was
little surge in the membership of the CPUSA. Full legal status simply
refers to the constitutional or institutional status given to the communist
party. The communist party (KPD) in the Federal Republic of Germany
was declared and remained illegal for a number of years, and hence was
not permitted to openly engage in many of the activities of other Euro-
pean communist parties.
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